Scout Reconnaissance Handbook

  1. Army Reconnaissance Manual
  2. St 3 20.983 Reconnaissance Handbook
  3. Reconnaissance Platoon Fm

Ram connection v8i with crack. The following manual was originally posted to Scribd by Joseph Larsen.FM 3-20.98 Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon622 pagesDistribution authorized to U.S.

Chapter 13 Reconnaissance Operations You can never have too much reconnaissance. General George S.

Patton Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947 Reconnaissance operations are those operations undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical or geographical characteristics and the indigenous population of a particular area. Reconnaissance primarily relies on the human dynamic rather than technical means.

Scout Reconnaissance Handbook

Reconnaissance is a focused collection effort. It is performed before, during, and after other operations to provide information used in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, as well as by the commander in order to formulate, confirm, or modify his course of action (COA). The four forms of reconnaissance are route, zone, area, and reconnaissance in force.

Name Stars Updated; Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Scout- Reconnaissance Role: Perceptions of U.S. Army Manned and Unmanned Aircraft Communities. FM 17-98 SCOUT PLATOON Preface Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION Chapter 2 BATTLE COMMAND Chapter 3 RECONNAISSANCE Chapter 4 SECURITY OPERATIONS.

CONTENTS 13-1. Reconnaissance identifies terrain characteristics, enemy and friendly obstacles to movement, and the disposition of enemy forces and civilian population so the commander can maneuver his forces freely and rapidly. Reconnaissance prior to unit movements and occupation of assembly areas is critical to protecting the force and preserving combat power. It also keeps the force free from contact as long as possible so that it can concentrate on its decisive operation. The commander orients his reconnaissance assets by identifying a reconnaissance objective within the area of operation (AO). The reconnaissance objective is a terrain feature, geographic area, or an enemy force about which the commander wants to obtain additional information. The reconnaissance objective clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance effort by specifying the most important result to obtain from the reconnaissance effort.

Every reconnaissance mission must specify a reconnaissance objective. The commander assigns a reconnaissance objective based on his priority information requirements (PIR) resulting from the IPB process and the reconnaissance asset's capabilities and limitations. The reconnaissance objective can be information about a specific geographical location, such as the cross-country trafficability of a specific area, a specific enemy activity to be confirmed or denied, or a specific enemy unit to be located and tracked. When the reconnaissance unit does not have enough time to complete all the tasks associated with a specific form of reconnaissance, it uses the reconnaissance objective to guide it in setting priorities. A commander may need to provide additional detailed instructions beyond the reconnaissance objective, such as the specific tasks he wants accomplished or the priority of tasks. He does this by issuing additional guidance to his reconnaissance unit or by specifying these instructions in his tasks to his subordinate units in the operation order.

For example, if, based on all technical and human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, a division G2 concludes that the enemy is not in an area and the terrain appears to be trafficable without obstacles, the division commander may decide he does not need a detailed reconnaissance effort forward of his unit. He may direct his cavalry squadron to conduct a zone reconnaissance mission with guidance to move rapidly and report by exception terrain obstacles that will significantly slow the movement of his subordinate maneuver brigades.

Alternatively, when the objective is to locate an enemy force, the reconnaissance objective would be that force, and additional guidance would be to conduct only that terrain reconnaissance necessary to find the enemy and develop the situation. The seven fundamentals of successful reconnaissance operations are as follows:. Ensure continuous reconnaissance.

Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve. Orient on the reconnaissance objective. Report information rapidly and accurately.

Retain freedom of maneuver. Gain and maintain enemy contact.

Develop the situation rapidly. Effective reconnaissance is continuous. The commander conducts reconnaissance before, during, and after all operations. Before an operation, reconnaissance focuses on filling gaps in information about the enemy and the terrain. During an operation, reconnaissance focuses on providing the commander with updated information that verifies the enemy's composition, dispositions, and intentions as the battle progresses. This allows the commander to verify which COA is actually being adopted by the enemy and determine if his plan is still valid based on actual events in the AO. After an operation, reconnaissance focuses on maintaining contact with the enemy to determine his next move and collecting information necessary for planning subsequent operations.

When information regarding the current operation is adequate, reconnaissance focuses on gathering information for branches and sequels to current plans. As a minimum, reconnaissance is conducted continuously as an integral part of all security missions, including the conduct of local security for forces not in contact.

Reconnaissance operations over extended distances and time may require pacing reconnaissance assets to maintain the effort, or rotating units to maintain continuous coverage. The human and technical assets used in the reconnaissance effort must be allowed time for rest, resupply, troop leading procedures, additional and refresher training, and preventative maintenance checks and services. The commander must determine not only where, but also when he will need his maximum reconnaissance effort and pace his reconnaissance assets to ensure that adequate assets are available at critical times and places. Reconnaissance assets, like artillery assets, are never kept in reserve. When committed, reconnaissance assets use all of their resources to accomplish the mission. This does not mean that all assets are committed all the time. The commander uses his reconnaissance assets based on their capabilities and METT-TC to achieve the maximum coverage needed to answer the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).

Army Reconnaissance Manual

At times, this requires the commander to withhold or position reconnaissance assets to ensure that they are available at critical times and places. The rest required by reconnaissance assets to sustain the reconnaissance effort is not to be obtained by placing them in reserve.

St 3 20.983 Reconnaissance Handbook

However, all reconnaissance assets should be treated as committed assets with specific missions assigned at all times. Units with multiple roles, specifically armored and air cavalry, that can conduct reconnaissance, security, and other combat missions in an economy-of-force role may be kept as a reserve for security or combat missions. The commander uses the reconnaissance objective to focus his unit's reconnaissance efforts. Commanders of subordinate reconnaissance elements remain focused on achieving this objective, regardless of what their forces encounter during the mission. When time, limitations of unit capabilities, or enemy action prevents a unit from accomplishing all the tasks normally associated with a particular form of reconnaissance, the unit uses the reconnaissance objective to focus the reconnaissance effort. Reconnaissance assets must acquire and report accurate and timely information on the enemy, civil considerations, and the terrain over which operations are to be conducted. Information may quickly lose its value.

Reconnaissance units report exactly what they see and, if appropriate, what they do not see. Seemingly unimportant information may be extremely important when combined with other information. Negative reports are as important as reports of enemy activity. Failure to report tells the commander nothing. The unit information management plan ensures that unit reconnaissance assets have the proper communication equipment to support the integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan.

Reconnaissance assets must retain battlefield mobility to successfully complete their missions. If these assets are decisively engaged, reconnaissance stops and a battle for survival begins. Reconnaissance assets must have clear engagement criteria that support the maneuver commander's intent. They must employ proper movement and reconnaissance techniques, use overwatching fires, and standing operating procedures (SOP).

Initiative and knowledge of both the terrain and the enemy reduce the likelihood of decisive engagement and help maintain freedom of movement. Prior to initial contact, the reconnaissance unit adopts a combat formation designed to gain contact with the smallest possible friendly element.

This provides the unit with the maximum opportunity for maneuver and enables it to avoid having the entire unit become decisively engaged. The IPB process can identify anticipated areas of likely contact to the commander. Using indirect fires to provide suppression and obscuration as well as destroy point targets is a method reconnaissance assets use to retain their freedom of maneuver. Once a unit conducting reconnaissance gains contact with the enemy, it maintains that contact unless the commander directing the reconnaissance orders otherwise or the survival of the unit is at risk. This does not mean that individual scout and reconnaissance teams cannot break contact with the enemy.

The commander of the unit conducting reconnaissance is responsible for maintaining contact using all available resources. That contact can range from surveillance to close combat.

Surveillance, combined with stealth, is often sufficient to maintain contact and is the preferred method. Units conducting reconnaissance avoid combat unless it is necessary to gain essential information, in which case the units use maneuver (fire and movement) to maintain contact while avoiding decisive engagement. When a reconnaissance asset encounters an enemy force or an obstacle, it must quickly determine the threat it faces.

For an enemy force, it must determine the enemy's composition, dispositions, activities, and movements and assess the implications of that information. For an obstacle, it must determine the type and extent of the obstacle and whether it is covered by fire. Obstacles can provide the attacker with information concerning the location of enemy forces, weapon capabilities, and organization of fires. In most cases, the reconnaissance unit developing the situation uses actions on contact. (See for a discussion of actions on contact.) 13-13. Military history contains numerous examples of the importance of reconnaissance operations. The following historical example illustrates the major role of reconnaissance operations in ensuring the success of an operation.

This non-US, medieval example illustrates that the study of other armies and other times has a great deal to contribute in helping the tactician understand the art and science of tactics. The Battle of the Sajo River Reconnaissance was critical in determining enemy dispositions and taking advantage of the terrain in this and many other Mongol battles. The Mongol army conducted continuous reconnaissance with a definite reconnaissance objective, and a significant part of their success resulted from their reconnaissance operations. During operations, light cavalry preceded each of their army's main columns performing reconnaissance.

They reported on terrain and weather conditions as well as the enemy's size, location, and movements. If a Mongol column met an enemy force that it could defeat, it did so. If it could not, its light cavalry maintained contact with the enemy, developed the situation to its advantage, and maintained freedom of movement. The Mongol light cavalry inflicted casualties and disrupted the enemy's movements while the main Mongol army deployed for action. Mongol Army Route Figure 13-2.

Mongol Army Pursuit In March 1241, a Mongol army of some 70,000 crossed the Carpathian Mountains from Russia into the Hungarian Plain. By mid-April, its light cavalry located the 100,000-man Hungarian army near the cities of Buda and Pest on the Danube River. In response, the Mongol army concentrated its previously dispersed columns as it approached the Danube. Once that the Mongols knew that they had been detected by the Hungarians, they deliberately withdrew about 100 miles northeast and led the Hungarians to a previously selected spot, Mohi Heath, on the Sajo River. The Mongols crossed the Sajo using an existing stone bridge and camped east of the river. The Hungarians followed and halted on the west bank, built a camp, took the stone bridge, and left a bridgehead on the east bank. Mongol reconnaissance discovered the location and dispositions within the Hungarian camp as well as a river-crossing site north of the camp.

Cav scout handbook

After dark, the main body of the Mongol army moved to cross the river at the crossing site. In addition to using the ford, the Mongols constructed a bridge to aid their crossing. The next morning, the remainder of the Mongol army conducted a supporting attack on the Hungarian force at the stone bridge, drawing the Hungarian army out of its camp to fight. While the supporting Mongol forces succeeded in recrossing the Sajo via the stone bridge, the fighting was hard and they nearly lost their battle while waiting for the main body to come to their support. After 2 hours, the Mongol main body fell on the Hungarian rear and flank, driving the Hungarians back into their camp. As was Mongol practice, they deliberately left an escape route from the enemy camp open. The ensuing Mongol pursuit destroyed the Hungarian army when they tried to withdraw from their camp.

The responsibility for conducting reconnaissance does not reside solely with specifically organized units. Every unit has an implied mission to report information about the terrain, civilian activities, and friendly and enemy dispositions, regardless of its battlefield location and primary function. Frontline troops and reconnaissance patrols of maneuver units at all echelons collect information on enemy units with which they are in contact. In rear areas, reserve maneuver forces, fire support assets, air defense, military police, host nation agencies, combat support, and combat service support elements observe and report civilian and enemy activity. Although all units conduct reconnaissance, those specifically trained in reconnaissance tasks are ground and air cavalry, scouts, long-range reconnaissance units, and Special Forces.

Some branches, such as the Corps of Engineers and the Chemical Corps, have specific reconnaissance tasks to perform that complement the force's overall reconnaissance effort. However, the corps and division commanders will primarily use their organic cavalry and intelligence elements to conduct reconnaissance operations. At battalion level and above, the commander assigns missions to his ISR assets based on their organization, equipment, and training.

The commander must know the capabilities and limitations of his available reconnaissance assets to ensure the employment of these assets within their capabilities and on missions for which they have been trained and equipped. Shows the typical nesting of ISR assets available at different tactical echelons.

The following manual was originally by Joseph Larsen. FM 3-20.98 Reconnaissance and Scout Platoon. 622 pages. Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information that is for official government use. August 3, 2009. 25 MB FM 3-20.98 provides basic tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the tactical employment of the reconnaissance and scout platoons of the reconnaissance squadrons in the heavy, infantry, and Stryker brigade combat teams (HBCT, IBCT, and SBCT) as well as the battlefield surveillance brigade’s (BFSB) reconnaissance and surveillance squadron and the cavalry squadron of the armored cavalry regiment (ACR).

This publication—. Provides doctrinal guidance for commanders and leaders of the currently transitioning organizations who are responsible for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations in the reconnaissance and scout platoons. Serves as an authoritative reference for personnel developing doctrine (fundamental principles and TTP), materiel and force structure, institutional and unit training, and standing operating procedures (SOP) for reconnaissance and scout platoon operations. It does not, however, cover deployment; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; or redeployment operations. Describes doctrine that is based on suggestions, insights, and observations from previously developed doctrine and from units and leaders taking part both in operational situations, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and in training at the Army’s combat training centers. These doctrinal principles and procedures are intended to be used as a guide and are not to be considered inflexible.

Each situation in combat must be resolved by an intelligent interpretation and application of the doctrine outlined in this manual. Is directed toward the reconnaissance and scout platoon leader and platoon sergeant (PSG). The manual reflects and supports Army operations doctrine as covered in FM 3-0, Operations; FM 3-90, Tactics; FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team; and FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron. It is not a stand-alone reference for reconnaissance and scout platoon operations; rather, it is intended to be used in conjunction with those and other existing doctrinal resources. Outlines the framework in which the five types of reconnaissance and scout platoons (HBCT, IBCT, SBCT, BFSB, and ACR) will operate, either by themselves or together as part of the troop or larger organization.

The manual also includes discussions of doctrine that is applicable to each specific type of platoon. THE OE IN RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS 3-33. Reconnaissance and scout platoons must be prepared to operate beyond the traditional roles of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition of enemy forces.

Reconnaissance Platoon Fm

Today, scouts must adjust their traditional roles to fulfill the broader mission of providing SU in its fullest sense. This involves an understanding of the OE in all its aspects, covering political, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time variables in addition to the military aspects of the OE.

This multidimensional requirement means that the platoon must develop an understanding of what is happening and why. In the asymmetric environment, identifying enemy centers of gravity, decisive points, and the means to influence the enemy’s will and behavior—while observing proper ROE—is one of the most important contributions that the platoon can make to ensure successful mission accomplishment. For more information on the OE, refer to FM 3-0. NONTRADITIONAL ASPECTS OF THE OE 3-34.

The Army has traditionally focused its efforts on traditional combat operations, based on open terrain, force-on-force battles, and symmetrical enemy formations, focusing on gaining information on the enemy and terrain. Platoon planning, however, must expand to include nontraditional aspects of OE variables that could influence its operations.

Asymmetric Warfare 3-35. Conditions in the new millennium, coupled with the technological developments of the information age, raise the specter of asymmetric warfare, a concept in which a weak opponent successfully engages a stronger opponent using a variety of non-conventional TTPs. The goal is to gain an advantage in hopes of achieving the weaker force’s objectives and goals. Asymmetric threats include—. Regional military forces. Paramilitary forces. Guerrillas and insurgents.

Terrorists. Criminal groups. Certain civilian groups and individuals. Political parties. Religious groups. Threat elements will use a number of nontraditional approaches in conducting asymmetric warfare, including the following:. Information operations (IO).

Handbook

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Operations in complex terrain. Civilian involvement (include hiding within the population and staging evasive attacks). Urban Considerations 3-37. The urban environment confronts commanders with a combination of difficulties rarely found in other settings in which the Army conducts operations. The distinct characteristics of the urban environment are primarily a function of the following factors:. The increasing size and global prevalence of urban areas.

The combinations of man-made features and supporting infrastructure superimposed on the existing natural terrain. The density of civilians in close proximity to combat forces. The human dimension represents potentially the most important and the most perplexing factor for commanders to understand and evaluate. Although urban terrain is complex, understanding it is a relatively straightforward process in comparison to comprehending the multifaceted nature of urban society. The urban environment is, first, a human environment. That makes it different from all other types. An urban environment is not solely defined by its structures or systems but by the people who compose it.

It reacts and interacts with an army in ways that no natural environment can. Military operations often require Army forces to operate in close proximity to a high density of civilians, whose presence, attitudes, actions, and needs in turn affect the conduct of operations. Civilian populations continually influence, to varying degrees, military operations within an AO.

As urban areas increase in size, they become less and less homogenous; therefore, commanders must understand and account for the characteristics of a diverse population whose beliefs and actions may vary based on many factors. Improving communications with the local population (especially using interpreters) can improve intelligence gathering and win acceptance of the platoon within that AO. Security requirements might change when these personnel are on vehicles and around digital communication systems. The decisive terrain during a military operation, particularly in stability operations, may be the civilian inhabitants themselves. To gain and/or retain the support of the civilian population, commanders must first understand (through reconnaissance) the complex nature and character of the urban society and its infrastructure. Scouts must then understand and accept that every military action (or inaction) may influence, positively or negatively, the relationship between the urban population and Army forces and, by extension, have a significant impact on mission success.

With this awareness, commanders visualize decisions they must make, plan operations, and implement programs. They can take immediate action to maintain support of a friendly populace, gain the support of neutral factions, or neutralize hostile elements. Unit continuity books maintaining feedback on past operations within the area will provide insight on past successful and unsuccessful missions and their results. HUMINT OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 3-152. HUMINT is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.

It uses human sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both passive and active, to gather information to satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements and cue other intelligence disciplines. HUMINT tasks include, but are not limited to, the following:. Source operations using tactical and other developed sources. Liaison with HN officials and allied counterparts.

Elicitation of information from the civilian populace, including transients. Identification of individuals as potential force protection sources. Debriefing of U.S. And allied forces and civilian personnel. Interrogation of EPWs and detainees. Information operations.

Translation and exploitation of threat documents, media, and other materials. All reconnaissance and scout platoon leaders can expect to conduct some form of HCT collection activities to gather the information needed to make decisions in support of the overall mission. HUMINT activities help the platoon leader shape the AO by providing information that enables him to respond to previously unforeseen threats. He focuses the HUMINT effort by carefully assigning missions and clearly defining the desired results. In orienting the unit’s HUMINT efforts and capabilities, the platoon leader must decide who or what will be advantageous targets for collection activities. As noted, only the SBCT reconnaissance platoon has organic HUMINT personnel.

Role of HUMINT Collectors 3-154. The SBCT platoon’s HUMINT Soldiers, who can be augmented by interrogators (from the MICO) when available, conduct collection operations in support of the overall mission.

These operations rely on the use of both casual and recruited sources of information. The collection effort includes liaison activities; the debriefing of refugees, detainees, and EPWs; review of open source literature; and DOMEX. HUMINT collectors directly support SE and subsequent intelligence gathering operations against the enemy. These operations use the techniques identified in FM 34-5 and FM 2-22.3. Other resources include AR 381-172, which covers policy concerning counterintelligence force protection source operations (CFSO), and AR 381-10, which outlines policies and procedures governing the conduct of intelligence activities by the Army. HUMINT Sources 3-156.

Platoon leaders should be familiar with the types of sources HUMINT personnel will use to satisfy command PIR:. Casual source. A casual source is one who, by social or professional position, has access to information of CI interest, usually on a continuing basis. Casual sources usually can be relied on to provide information that is routinely available to them. Casual sources include private citizens, such as retired officials or other prominent residents of an area. Official sources. These are liaison contacts.

CI personnel conduct liaison with foreign and domestic CI, intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies to exchange information and obtain assistance. CI personnel focus on investigative, operational, and threat information. Recruited sources. These include sources who support CFSO, as identified in FM 34-5. By design, CFSOs entail the use of human source networks, dispersed throughout the area that can provide timely and pertinent force protection information. Refugees, detainees, and EPWs. Interrogators normally conduct collection operations with these sources, often with technical assistance from a CI agent.

Open source publications. These printed materials, as well as radio and television broadcasts, are valuable sources of information of CI interest and operational information. Depending on the resources, this support can be provided by interrogation personnel, allied personnel, indigenous employees, or reserve component translators. Documents not openly available.

Such sources as adversary plans and reports are exploited in much the same way as open source publications. Reconnaissance Support Activities 3-157. In military urban operations, people (EPWs and civilians) are the preeminent source of information. HUMINT collection provides information otherwise not available through SIGINT and image intelligence (IMINT).

As an example, when a lodgment is made in a building, the HUMINT collectors:. Move in and interrogate EPWs.

Persuade holdouts to surrender. Help with the questioning and evacuation of noncombatants. Collect information on floor plans and defensive plans. Determine locations of combatants and noncombatants in the area.